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CASE COMMENTS
where a tract of land was left to a city for a park for white persons
only, the fourteenth amendment was enforced despite an attempt by
the city government to circumvent it by appointing private trustees
to manage it.32
By ruling the electorate to be an agent of the state, the California
court clearly brought Mulkey within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment affirmative state action doctrine. By doing so, however,
the court placed its ruling on very tenuous grounds, for it is difficult
indeed, to find the barest elements of a traditional agency relationship
between the state and the electorate. Certainly the state could not
have exercised any of the principal's traditional prerogatives over
its agent. This is not to say, however, that absent the state-electorate
agency fiction, Mulkey would have been decided otherwise. The state
involvement doctrine is sufficient to extend the fourteenth amendment
to the fact situation in Mulkey. Any state electoral process has a large
amount of state involvement. The state prints the ballots, provides the
polling places, and certifies the results. If the result of such an electoral
process is discriminatory, as was the case in Mulkey, then the process,
with the state involvement, would be unconstitutional. Analysis of the
problem on the basis of state involvement, rather than state action,
would have been the more logical approach.
STAFFORD W. KEEGIN
SPECIAL DAMAGES REQUIREMENT FOR LIBEL PER QUOD
The two principal categories of libel, or written defamation, are
libel per se and libel per quod. Libel per se is any publication de-
famatory on its face; libel per quod is a publication defamatory only in
light of extrinsic facts.1 The common law rule of libel was that any
publication proven libelous, even if by extrinsic facts, was actionable
without proof of special damages. 2 In the late nineteenth century
courts began to adopt the view that special, or pecuniary, damages
must be proved to recover for libel per quod while libel per se re-
mained actionable without any such proof.3 The requirement of special
tremely similar fact situations between In re Girard and Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966), there is a distinguishing fact in that the park in Evans is mani-
festly a public facility and Girard College is not.
32Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
1BLAcK, LAW DICrIONARY (4th ed. 1951); Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 146
A.2d 880, 883-94 (1958).
2Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (K.B. 1812).
3 See, e.g., Walker v. Tribune Co., 29 Fed. 827 (C.C.N.D. II. 1887); Tonini v.
Cevasco, 114 Cal. 266. 46 Pac. 103 (1896); Fry v. McCord, 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W.
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damages in libel per quod, though, has never been fully accepted by
the courts, and as a result the case law in the area remains confused.4
The prevailing law is that libel per quod requires proof of special
damages unless the extrinsic facts proved place the defamation in one
of the four categories which constitute slander per se.5 The early
rule of slander was that it was not actionable unless actual damage was
proved.6 The courts soon began to recognize certain exceptions to this
rule and allowed recovery without special damages for slander falling
into one of four categories known as slander per se. These four cate-
gories are imputations of: (1) crime; 7 (2) loathsome disease;8 (3) con-
duct or characteristics tending to hurt or prejudice the plaintiff's repu-
tation thus affecting his business, profession, or trade;9 and (4) un-
chastity of a woman.1 ° All other slander requires special damage for
recovery. The prevailing law in the area of libel per quod is to treat
the libel per quod exactly as slander. Therefore, unless the extrinsic
facts place the defamation in one of the four slander per se areas
special damages are needed for recovery.
The Restatement of Torts" adheres to the common law rule that all
libel, either per se or per quod, is actionable without proof of special
damages. A few cases apparently follow the Restatement rule but only
568 (1895). The uniqueness of these decisions is attested to by Carpenter, Libel
Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17 So. CAL. L. REV. 347 (1944).
4Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875, 890 (1956).
5itzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941); McBride v. Crowell-
Collier Publishing Co., 196 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1952); Karrigan v. Valentine, 184
Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co.,
169 Ky. 64, 183 S.W. 269 (1916); Campbell v. Post Publishing Co., 94 Mont. 12,
20 P.2d 1063 (1933); Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d
594 (1949); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938);
Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400
(1936); Moore v. P. W. Publishing Co., 3 Ohio St. 2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 412 (1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 367 (1966); Hargrove v. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co., 130
Okla. 76, 265 Pac. 635 (1928); Fry v. McCord, 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895).
Several jurisdictions have not yet dealt directly with the problem, but there
are dicta in the following jurisdictions to the effect that publication proved
defamatory by extrinsic facts requires special damages: Myers v. Mobile Press-
Register, Inc., 266 Ala. 508, 97 So. 2d 819 (1957); Langworthy v. Pulitizer Pub-
lishing Co, 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); Malouf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
75 Utah 175, 283 Pac. 1065 (1929).
6PRossR, ToRs § 107 at 772 (3d ed. 1964).
7Reitan v. Goebel, 33 Minn. 151, 22 N.W. 291 (1885).
8Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 Term R. 473, 100 Eng. Rep. 255 (K.B. 1788).
9Fowles v. Bowen, 30 N.Y. 20 (1864) (business); Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) (profession).
10Cushing v. Hederman, 117 Iowa 637, 91 N.W. 940 (1902).
1 1RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 569 (1938).
CASE COMMENTS
in dicta, and these cases involve either libel per se or libel per quod
within one of the four slander per se categories.1
2
Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc.,13 a decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York, is a recent case involving the question
of whether proof of special damages is necessary to recover for libel
per quod. The defendant newspaper published a notice of engagement
between the plaintiffs, stating that Robert W. Hinsdale would marry
Miss Concetta Kay Rieber. Plaintiffs alleged the extrinsic facts that
both were already married and living with their respective spouses
and children. Thus, the publication, if libelous at all, falls within the
libel per quod category. No special damages were alleged or proved
by the parties, therefore the trial court dismissed the complaint, and
the appellate division affirmed. 14 The Court of Appeals reversed,
opening the way to recovery without special damages.15 While the
publication of a false engagement notice involving two single people
may not be libelous, the publication of such a notice involving persons
already married to other parties is libelous. All of the cases relied upon
in Hinsdale allowing recovery without proof of special damages in-
volved either libel per se' 6 or libel per quod in one of the four slander
categories.1' The court specifically refuted any argument that Hinsdale
falls within the slander per se area in that the publication impugns the
chastity of Mrs. Rieber by stating that the publication "does not
necessarily charge sexual immorality .... Is
The only other case decided by the New York Court of Appeals
in which the publication was libel per quod within one of the four
slander per se categories and in which recovery was allowed was
i2Herrrnann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61
(App. Div. 1958); Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wash. 2d 763, 388 P.2d 976
(1964); Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
1317 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
l4Hinsdale v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 705, 261
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1966).
1517 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
16Conroy v. Breland, 185 Miss. 787, 189 So. 814 (1939); Spector v. News Syndi-
cate Co, 280 N.Y. 346, 21 N.E.2d 185 (1939).
17Balabanoff v. Hearst Consol. Publishers, 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945);
Henry v. New York Post, 280 N.Y. 842, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939); Braun v. Armour
& Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251
N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929); Smith v. Smith, 236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923);
Blake v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 229 N.Y. 515, 129 N.E. 897 (1920);
Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890); Murphy
v. Harty, 238 Ore. 228, 393 P.2d 206 (1964); Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63
Wash. 2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1964) (there is however, dicta to the effect that the
court would allow recovery in any libel by extrinsic fact case).
18217 N.E.2d at 651, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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Sydney v. McFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp.19 Sydney, pre-
senting a fact situation nearly identical to that in Hinsdale, involved
a newspaper announcement which stated that Miss Doris Keane was
Fatty Arbuckle's lady love and hinted at a possible future marriage.
But "Miss Keane" proved the extrinsic fact of her marriage to
Basil Sydney and the court allowed recovery without proof of special
damages. 20 The Court of Appeals has generally adhered to the common
law rule of not requiring special damages,21 but only Sydney and
Hinsdale are contrary to the prevailing law in the libel per quod area.p
There is some confusion in New York23 because the lower courts
follow the prevailing law in the libel per quod category. 4 The
reason for this situation in the lower New York courts is the mis-
interpretation of the holding in O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co2 5
In O'Connell the defendant newspaper published an article concern-
ing criminal prosecutions of certain sugar company officials for
cheating their customers by use of crooked weighing machines. The
publication indicated that another company official was also to be
prosecuted. The article, in identifying the witness O'Connell as an
official of the company, stated that he was the inventor, of a steel
spring essential to the machines. Plaintiff alleged that the statements
indicated that he was engaged in criminal conduct. However, the
court denied recovery, holding simply that the publication did not
support the alleged innuendo of criminality.20 While O'Connell actual-
ly denied recovery because the publication was not defamatory, the
19242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926).
20Libe1 by extrinsic fact involves the inducement. The only necessity in this
instance is to prove the extrinsic fact which thus renders the writing as stated
defamatory.
21See Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. NBC, 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214
N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961). Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E.
432 (1929); Blake v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 229 N.Y. 515, 129 N.E.
897 (1920); Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890).
Harwood is particularly important because it cites O'Connell and still follows
Sydney.
22Supra note 5.
28Note, 27 FORDHAM L. Rav. 405 (1958).
24See Everett v. Gross, 22 App. Div. 2d 257, 254 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1964); Macri v.
Mayer, 22 Misc. 2d 429, 201 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Solotaire v. Cowles
Magazines, Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Legion Against Vivisection,
Inc. v. Grey, 63 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
25214 N.Y. 352, log N.E. 556 (1915).
26Libel by innuendo, whether with or without extrinsic fact, involves a publica-
tion in which the statement is susceptible of a defamatory meaning. The plaintiff
is usually asserting that an interpretation of the words as they stand is defamatory.
O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., supra note 25.
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lower New York courts have interpreted it as standing for the propo-
sition that special damages are necessary to recover in a libel per quod
action.
2 7
Hinsdale could be viewed as adhering to the common law rule,
approved by the Restatement of Torts, that all libel, per se or per
quod, is actionable without proof of special damages. It is also possible
that Hinsdale is not opposed to the prevailing law in the area of libel
per quod but has merely created a fifth category of libel per quod
not requiring special damages. This category encompasses marital in-
tentions and marital status. While there is no precedent for it in the
slander area, written publications concerning marital status which
have a tendency to bring the parties into public disgrace, scorn,
ridicule, and contempt have been held actionable without proof of
special damage.28 Gersten v. Nevark Morning Ledger held that any
false publication of marital discord is defamatory on its face and action-
able without proof of special damages.30 Numerous other cases pro-
tect existing marital status from any publication placing it in a bad
light.31
In addition to the protection of existing marital status, two cases,
Kirman v.'Sun Printing & Publishing Ass' n 2 and Orband v. Kalama-
zoo Tel. Co.,33 support the view that false imputations of matrimonial
intentions in a publication are actionable without proof of special
damages. Orband involved a newspaper publication which attributed
to Miss Orband a statement denying her engagement to Peter Mulder.
In addition Miss Orband denied that any rumor of the engagement
ever existed and that the newspaper article denouncing the engagement
was unnecessary. Moreover, the statements attributed to her were
misquoted. It was common knowledge according to Miss Orband
27Supra note 24.
2SRepublican Publishing Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 24 Pac. 1051 (1890) (de-
famatory on its face); Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., 122 App. Div. 332, 106
N.Y. Supp. 875 (1907) (defamatorv on its face); Woolworth v. Star Co., 97 App.
Div. 525, 90 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1904) (defamatory on its face); Bradley v. Cramer,
59 Wis. 309, 18 N.WV. 268 (1884) (defamatory on its face).
2952 N.J. Super. 152, 145 A.2d 56 (1958) (The publication is defamatory on its
face).
80145 A.2d at 59.
31See, e.g., Taylor v. Tribune Publishing Co., 67 Fla. 361, 65 So. 3 (1914) (slander
per se category); Smith v. Smith, 73 Mich. 445, 41 N.W. 499 (1889) (slander per
se category); De Festetics v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 57 Misc. 194, 109
N.Y. Supp. 30 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (slander per se category); Stokes v. Morning
journal Ass'n, 72 App. Div. 184, 76 N.Y. Supp. 429 (1902) (slander per se cate-
gory).
3299 App. Div. 367, 91 N.Y. Supp. 193 (1904) (defamatory on its face).
33170 Mich. 387, 136 N.W. 380 (1912).
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that Mulder was an uncouth degenerate notorious for his convictions
of public drunkenness. The court held the publication to be libelous
and allowed recovery without proof of special damages.3 4 KirInan
involved a newspaper article stating, among other things, that the plain-
tiff went to a hall to be married, guests attended, and the bridegroom
failed to appear. Plaintiff proved that she was never engaged, that no
such events ever occurred, and that the story tended to subject her
to public ridicule. Kirman allowed recovery without the necessity of
proving special damages.
35
Three cases relied upon by Hinsdale allowed recovery without
proof of special damages. In Morey v. Morning Journal Ass'n,3 6 Morey
alleged that he was defamed as a result of a newspaper article which
stated that he was threatened with suit for breach of a promise to
marry. Morey proved he was a married man and introduced evidence
concerning the nature of his business and the effect the publication
had on it. It is unclear whether the court based its decision on the
damage to his business or on the fact that he was married. In Henry
v. New York Post, InC.,'3 7 Louise Henry, a motion picture actress,
was defamed by an article concerning the status of her marriage and
the reasons for a divorce suit. She alleged that although the publication
referred to a different person, due to peculiar circumstances she was
defamed in her profession. Smith v. Smith38 involved a sworn appli-
cation for a marriage license filed by the defendant which stated that
he was never married. The plaintiff, his divorced wife, claimed that
she was defamed since this was a public record and that the details
were published in various newspapers. The fact that Hinsdale relies on
these cases further supports the interpretation that Hinsdale has estab-
lished a fifth category which allows recovery for libel per quod with-
out proof of special damages.3 9
In all of the previous cases mentioned in connection with this fifth
category, the publication was, however, either defamatory on its face,40
or the extrinsic facts placed the defamation in one of the already
established four slander per se categories. 41 Thus, it may be that the
interpretation of Hinsdale as establishing a fifth category is weakened
by this factor.
34 136 N.W. at 382.
S5Kirman v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, supra note 32.
36123 N.Y. 207, 25 N.E. 161 (1890) (slander per se category).
37280 N.Y. 842, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939) (slander per se category).
38236 N.Y. 581, 142 N.E. 292 (1923) (slander per se category).
39217 NE.2d at 653, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
4oSupra notes 29, 29, 32, and 33.
41Supra notes 31, 36, 37, and 38.
